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ABSTRACT 
Institutional constraints have been offered by some scholars as an explanation for why 
multiparty coalitions should be more peaceful than single party cabinets.  Yet others see 
the same institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior. Recent 
research has investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results. We 
examine the theoretical bases for these alternative expectations about the effects of 
coalition politics on foreign policy. We find that previous research is limited theoretically 
by confounding institutional effects with policy positions, and empirically by analyzing 
only international conflict data.  We address these limitations by examining cases of 
foreign policy behavior using the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset.  
Consistent with our observation that institutional constraints have been confounded with 
policy positions, we find that coalitions are neither more aggressive nor more peaceful, 
but do engage in more extreme foreign policy behaviors.  These findings are discussed 
with regard to various perspectives on the role of institutions in shaping foreign policy 
behavior.   
 
 
 
Authors’ note: An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of 
the International Studies Association, March 2004.  We thank Rachel McGuire for her 
research assistance with that paper.  We also thank Phil Schrodt for his very useful 
comments on this article’s analyses.  This investigation was supported by the University 
of Kansas General Research Fund allocation #2301-FY2005 and –FY2007. 
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Research on how political institutions affect foreign policy typically focuses on 
the pacifying consequences of democratic institutions.  Political systems that include 
more voices and interests in the policymaking process purportedly require more time to 
mobilize domestic players, and input from domestic constituencies presumably constrains 
leaders who might otherwise take their country to war.  This idea is at the heart of the 
institutional, or structural explanation of the democratic peace, but it has been used by 
others comparing different types of democratic institutions as well.  Some have argued, 
for example, that democratic political systems with powerful legislatures, compared to 
systems with weak legislative bodies, will more likely render an executive reluctant to 
use force (Auerswald, 1999; Reiter and Tillman, 2002). 
The notion that institutional constraints translate into more peaceful international 
behavior has also been used in propositions regarding the effects of coalition politics on 
the foreign policy of multiparty cabinets.  Yet an alternative view sees the same 
institutional setting as a prescription for more aggressive behavior.  Recent research has 
investigated these conflicting expectations, but with mixed results.  In this article, we 
examine the theoretical bases for alternative expectations about the effects of coalition 
politics on foreign policy.  We argue that recent investigations have addressed these 
perspectives in a fairly limited way, both theoretically and empirically, and offer a new 
study using some 26,000 cases of foreign policy behavior by parliamentary democracies 
from the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) dataset.  In this investigation, we 
compare the foreign policy behaviors of coalition cabinets to those of single party 
cabinets in terms of levels of conflict/cooperation, extremity, and commitment. 
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COALITION POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: 
PEACE OR CONFLICT? 
 
Despite the diffusion of governmental powers and the increased number of actors 
who seek to influence the process in most democratic systems, the authority to make 
foreign policy in parliamentary democracies remains with the cabinet (Nousiainen and 
Blondel, 1993). When this decision making authority is shared by two or more political 
parties in coalition, the cabinet can provide a distinct and partisan context.  Coalition 
cabinets occur with great frequency in Western Europe. More than 70 percent of post-
World War II West European governments have been multiparty coalitions (Gallagher, 
Lavel, and Mair, 2001:357) and some states, such as the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Italy, are almost always ruled by multiparty cabinets.  Not limited to Western Europe, 
coalitions can also be found in parliamentary democracies world-wide, such as in 
Hungary, India, Israel, Japan, and Turkey. The presence of coalition governments in 
important states in world affairs begs the question: how important is this institutional 
distinction for understanding the foreign policies of parliamentary democracies?  Do 
single-party cabinets behave differently in foreign policy than do coalition cabinets? 
Surprisingly, there is no scholarly consensus on the way in which coalition 
politics should influence foreign policy.    Disagreement primarily turns on the degree 
and nature of political and institutional constraints in coalitions.  This, in turn, generates 
competing assertions about the likelihood of aggressive as opposed to peaceful behavior.  
Those who see coalitions as highly constrained, expect peaceful foreign policies; those 
who see coalitions as unconstrained, expect more aggressive behaviors.  Aggressive 
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behavior also arguably comes from other institutional dynamics associated with 
coalitions, namely problems of weakness and legitimacy and disproportionate influence 
of ideologically extreme junior coalition partners.   
The expectation that coalitions will engage in peaceful foreign policy primarily 
rests on the notion that coalitions are highly constrained.  Political and institutional 
constraints in coalitions stem from a number of institutional characteristics.  Many see 
coalitions as highly constrained because of the high levels of conflict that can occur 
among the parties (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993).  Differences that are not resolved 
at the formation stage of a coalition are likely to contribute to conflictual policymaking 
and to cabinet instability (Prins and Sprecher, 1999).  Indeed, one survey of ministers in 
several Western European countries confirmed that coalition cabinets tend to have more 
internal disagreements than single-party cabinets and that this conflict increases with 
more parties in the cabinet (Frognier, 1993).  This conflictual process has consequences 
for the life of the cabinet.  Not only are coalitions short-lived, compared to single-party 
cabinets holding a majority of parliamentary seats, coalition cabinets are much more 
likely to dissolve because of internal, cabinet disunity (Strøm, 1990).    
Constraints in coalitions originate from other sources as well. After the formation 
of the coalition, for example, “…the scope of governmental action tends to be markedly 
constrained by the coalition agreement.  Therefore coalition cabinets often have less 
freedom of manoeuvre than single-party governments:  not so many matters are left 
open” (Blondel and Müller-Rommel, 1993:9).  Multiple parties and vigilant parliaments 
are additional sources of constraint.  More actors involved in the process means more 
constrained executives, as “coalition governments require the executive to consult more 
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parties and avoid unpopular policies that might split the government” (Ripsman, 
2002:46). 
The constraints in which coalitions operate presumably dampen aggression.  This 
argument is consistent with the institutional explanation of the democratic peace – the 
more built-in constraints in democracies (via checks-and-balances, multiple viewpoints, 
and accountability), the more peace-loving political actors and publics can constrain war-
prone leaders. Indeed, Maoz and Russett (1993:626) propose that coalition governments 
are among the most constrained among democracies and thus should be the most peaceful 
towards each other.  This logic has informed a number of studies hypothesizing that 
coalition governments will be less likely or able to reciprocate in militarized disputes 
(Prins and Sprecher, 1999), to become involved in international disputes to begin with 
(Rieter and Tillman, 2002; Palmer, London, and Regan, 2004;), or to be involved in war 
generally (Leblang and Chan, 2003).   The proposition that leaders of coalitions are 
constrained from pursuing aggressive foreign policies has also been applied to case 
studies of Israeli (Elman, 2000) and French (Auerswald, 1999; Ripsman, 2002) decision 
making. 
Others disagree, arguing that the institutional and political dynamics of coalitions 
provide conditions that promote more aggressive foreign policies.  Part of the expectation 
that coalitions are more aggressive directly challenges the idea that coalitions are 
constrained.  Indeed, some see coalitions as “constraint free” (Hagan 1993:27).  This 
stems from a diffusion of authority and accountability. “With coalition governments, the 
voting public may be less able to attach responsibility to any one party for policy failures.  
Presumably then, coalition leaders would have greater flexibility in their handling of 
 7 
foreign affairs” (Prins and Sprecher, 1999:275). With this logic, Prins and Sprecher 
hypothesize that “coalition governments tend to be less accountable than single-party 
cabinets and as a result should be less constrained in decisionmaking.  These types of 
governments should be more willing to reciprocate militarized disputes” (1999:275).   
Coalition governments may also engage in more aggressive behavior due to their 
inherent institutional weaknesses.  This logic is consistent with diversionary theories of 
international conflict (Levy, 1989).  According to Hagan, “the literature suggests that 
even the most unstable coalition may try to act on major foreign policy issues in order to 
demonstrate its ability to cope with policy crises and thereby achieve some legitimacy at 
home….In effect, because of their political fragmentation and vulnerability, these 
weakened actors were often compelled to deal with the most difficult issues in order to 
legitimize themselves….” (Hagan 1993:30-31).  Moreover, “…the relatively higher level 
of domestic uncertainty that surrounds coalition cabinets may…encourage greater risk-
taking behavior” (Prins and Sprecher, 1999:275).  
Aggressive foreign policy behaviors could also come from the ability of junior 
coalition partners to “hijack” the coalition and push them towards the extreme. As Elman 
notes,  “…in less majoritarian democracies, such as presidential and coalitional 
parliamentary systems, groups in favor of war will be better situated to push the state 
down that road, even if the executive favors a more moderate approach” (Elman, 
2000:97). Because the senior parties, which are often center-of-the-road “catch-all” 
parties, might have to rely on smaller, often more ideologically extreme, junior parties to 
maintain a majority of seats in parliament, they are vulnerable to blackmail by these 
partners; the senior party must bargain with its junior partner or the latter may defect 
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from the coalition.  Junior partners can use a variety of strategies to influence foreign 
policy and while they are not always successful, they have been influential at key times in 
the foreign policies of important states, such as Germany and Israel (Kaarbo, 1996a, 
1996b).   
 Given these conflicting expectations regarding coalitions and their possible 
effects on foreign policy, it is not surprising that the empirical evidence is decidedly 
mixed.  In support of the proposition that coalitions breed aggressive foreign policy, Prins 
and Sprecher (1999) found that coalition cabinets are more likely to reciprocate behavior 
in militarized interstate disputes than were single-party parliamentary governments and 
Palmer et al. (2004) found that coalitions were slightly more likely to become involved in 
international disputes.  On the other hand, Ireland and Gartner (2001) and Reiter and 
Tillman (2002) found no difference between single party and coalition cabinets in dispute 
initiation and Palmer et al. (2004) found no difference between single and multiparty 
cabinets in dispute escalation.  Leblang and Chan (2003) found that whether the cabinet 
was unified under a single party was not related to war involvement, although whether 
the electoral system was based on proportional representation, which is highly correlated 
with coalition governments, was significantly important as these types of system were 
less likely to be involved in war. 
 
CHALLENGING CURRENT THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS 
AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
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 These mixed results may not be surprising given the competing expectations 
about the peacefulness of foreign policy by coalitions that in turn stem from conflicting 
assumptions about the nature of political constraints and the role that weak institutions 
and junior parties play in coalition policymaking. Moreover, many of these theoretical 
arguments confound institutional effects with the positions of political parties.  Indeed, 
implicit in the argument that hijacked coalitions engage in more aggressive behavior is 
the assumption that junior partners favor aggressive policies and are able to push the 
cabinet in this direction because of the nature of coalition politics.  Similarly, implicit in 
the argument that coalitions are peaceful is the assumption that coalition leaders prefer 
more aggressive choices but are constrained by the institutional context.   
 Of course, both assumptions may be misdirected.  Junior parties, for example, 
may favor more peaceful policies and propel the cabinet in that direction.  The Green 
party, as a junior party in the current German coalition, arguably pushed the cabinet, not 
just constrained it, toward a more peaceful position vis-à-vis Iraq in 2002 (Kaarbo and 
Lantis, 2003).  And peace-prone prime ministers would presumably be just as constrained 
as war-prone ones by the institutional checks on their actions.  Given these reasons, it is 
difficult to expect coalitions to be either generally peaceful or generally aggressive 
without knowing the preferences of the coalition actors.  We agree with Elman that 
“structure alone does not account for war propensities—we need to specify actors’ 
preferences before structure can tell us anything” (Elman, 2000:125).  Without 
knowledge of the specific actors serving to constrain policy choices and their substantive 
position on those policy choices, predicting specific policies will be difficult. We thus 
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expect that coalitions will reveal no systematic tendency toward either conflictual or 
cooperative behavior.   
Yet institutions, such as cabinet structure, may still have an independent effect on 
foreign policy. Structure may tell us something about the nature, but not the direction, of 
coalition foreign policies.  There are two possibilities, based on the competing theoretical 
expectations.  If one follows the logic that coalitions are vulnerable to hijacking by 
extreme junior parties, are largely unaccountable, and seek legitimacy in risky foreign 
policies -- one would expect extreme behaviors, with coalitions choosing both more 
aggressive and more peaceful foreign policies, compared to single-party governments.i  
If, alternatively, one follows the logic that coalition politics constrain both dovish and 
hawkish prime ministers, one would expect moderate behaviors and coalitions should 
adopt middle-of-the-road policies. Indeed, one prominent image of coalition cabinets is 
that they, compared to single-party cabinets and other types of executives, produce very 
little coordinated policy because they are immobilized or deadlocked by their 
circumstances (Hagan, 1993; Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Elman, 2000; Hagan, Everts, 
Fukui, and Stempel, 2001).ii 
 Thus, we argue, we should expect to see differences in the foreign policy of 
coalitions, as compared to single party governments, but these differences are not in 
terms of the substance or direction of the policies.  Rather, the institutional and political 
dynamics of coalitions impact the nature, or character of the foreign policy.  We should 
expect either highly constrained foreign policy, with little meaningful action taken, or 
extreme foreign policies.  Previous research on the effects of coalition politics has not 
examined this possibility that the same underlying mechanisms used to predict aggression 
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or peace may in fact predict extremity or moderation.  This may explain the mixed results 
that this research has generated. 
 Progress in research on the effects of coalition politics on foreign policy is also 
hindered by the tendency to focus too narrowly on conflict-related dependent variables 
rather than more general foreign policy behavior. Because many studies are following in 
the tradition of the democratic peace research, investigations into structural influences on 
foreign policy have focused on conflict initiation and escalation (Prins and Sprecher, 
1999; Ireland and Gartner, 2001; Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Palmer et al., 2004), paying 
less attention to the wider variety of foreign policy behaviors typically engaged in by 
governments.  Such conflict-based dependent variables are problematic for at least three 
reasons.  First, during times of conflict and crisis, disagreements within governments may 
be most likely to be suppressed or minimized (Hermann, 1969; Vertberger, 1990; 
Verbeek, 2003).  Second, conflict and crisis behavior is a fairly narrow slice of the broad 
array of foreign policy behaviors in which states engage.   The third reason is related to 
the previously discussed theoretical argument.  A focus on conflict perpetuates the focus 
on the substance of the policy, confounds institutional constraints with policy 
preferences, and does not allow for the possibility that cabinet type might be related to 
the character, but not the content, of foreign policy. 
 
EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF COALITION POLITICS ON EVENT BEHAVIOR 
 
 To address some of the limitations in previous research, this study examines the 
character, as well as the content, of general foreign policy behaviors of single party and 
coalition cabinets.  Specifically, we investigate the levels of conflict and extremity in 
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foreign policies using a subset of the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) as 
developed by McClelland (1976) and updated by Tomlinson (1993). The WEIS dataset 
catalogues the actions of all major international players in “newsworthy” events from 
1966 to 1991 (McClelland, 1966; Tomlinson, 1993). For each event, WEIS identifies the 
actor (originator of the action), the type of action, the target of the action and the arena or 
situational/episodic context in which the event occurred. Actions include both verbal (i.e. 
statements of policy support and threats) and non-verbal (i.e. grants of aid and military 
clashes) acts. Using the WEIS data, this study is able to investigate the effects of 
coalition politics on a wide range of foreign policy behaviors across a large number of 
events, a large set of parliamentary democracies, and a great length of time.   
 
Cases and Variables 
 
The actors selected from this dataset are the major parliamentary democracies, 
including many West European states, but also states in North America, Oceania, 
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.  The cases analyzed are 26,844 events including 
11,933 from single-party cabinets and 14,911 from multiparty coalitions and cover a 
range of issues, from 1966 to 1989.iii The countries and their cabinet types are listed in 
Table 1. 
--- Table 1 here --- 
 
Whether each parliamentary democracy was a coalition or a single party 
government serves as our independent variable.  For each actor in the WEIS dataset that 
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was a parliamentary democracy, we determined the cabinet type-- if it was a single-party 
or coalition cabinet at the time of the event -- by consulting standard sources.iv  Cabinets 
that formally contained at least two independent political parties were coded as 
coalitions.  Minority cabinets that only included one party, but which relied on the 
support of other parties in parliament, were coded as single-party cabinets.  Political 
parties that were in permanent electoral alliance (e.g. the CDU and CSU in Germany) 
were considered to be single parties.   
We chose three dependent variables to examine the effects of coalition politics on 
international behavior.  The first dependent variable is the level of cooperation and 
conflict in the actor’s behavior.  The level of cooperation in the actor’s behavior is 
indicated by the widely-used conflict-cooperation scale developed by Goldstein (1992).  
This scale translates WEIS event categories into an ordinal scale that ranges from -10 
(indicating the highest levels of conflict) to +10 (indicating the highest levels of 
cooperation).  
The next two dependent variables are designed to assess the extremity of the 
foreign policy behaviors engaged in by single party and coalition cabinets.  The first 
assesses extremity by taking the Goldstein conflict-cooperation scale and folding it at the 
mid-point.  This gives a measure of the extremity of conflict or cooperative behavior.v  
Actions that are very cooperative or very conflictual will receive a higher score (more 
extreme) than those that are only moderately cooperative or conflictual (less extreme). By 
folding the scale we no longer have information about the content of the behavior 
(cooperation or conflict), only its character (more or less extreme).  Finally, we measure 
extremity by classifying behaviors into two categories.  Following Schrodt and Gerner 
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(2004), we divided WEIS actions into material and verbal categories.  We then classified 
them as low and high commitment of resources, following East (1973).  Low 
commitment behaviors are purely verbal behaviors, while high commitment behaviors 
involve some commitment of resources.vi  We consider high commitment behaviors to 
represent more extreme behavior than low commitment behaviors. 
The first hypothesis relates to the proposition that the institutional circumstances 
of coalitions translate directly into the content, either cooperative or conflictual, of 
foreign policy.  We have argued that, whether or not coalition governments are more or 
less constrained, it is not possible to predict the level of cooperation or conflict of the 
foreign policy behavior.  Constraints, if they exist, can equally constrain peaceful or war-
prone proclivities and junior parties can hijack policies towards peace or towards conflict.  
Thus, we expect to see no difference between coalition governments and single party 
governments in terms of the conflict-cooperation variable.     
The second hypothesis is aimed at the question of the independent effect that the 
institutional context of coalitions may have on the characteristics of foreign policy 
behavior.  If coalition governments are, in fact, more constrained than single party 
governments, then we would expect to see less extreme (more moderate) foreign policy 
behaviors from coalitions than single party governments.  If, on the other hand, coalitions 
are not constrained, are susceptible to ideologically extreme (dovish and hawkish) junior 
parties, or try to divert attention away from their domestic political weakness through 
highly visible foreign policies, then we should see more extreme (less moderate) foreign 
policy behaviors.  This should apply equally to conflict-cooperation extremity  as well as 
extremity associated with level of commitment.vii   
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 We include in our analysis two control variables.  In order to examine the 
independent effect of cabinet type on the dependent variables, we included a measure of 
the actor’s power. We used the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) from 
the Correlates of War National Military Capabilities dataset (Version 3.0) (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972; Singer, 1987). We expect that both a country’s level of 
conflict-cooperation and extremity would reflect their level of national capabilities, 
regardless of the type of the cabinet (East, 1973).  
Given findings from numerous studies on the dyadic democratic peace, we also 
include an additional control variable in our analysis of the level of conflict-cooperation. 
This variable indicates if the target of the action was democratic (all of the actors in our 
analyses are democratic).  We used the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) to 
code whether the target, if another state, was a democracy.viii  States receiving a 
democracy score of greater than seven on a ten point scale were coded as democratic, 
otherwise they were coded as non-democratic.   
 
Results 
 The effects of cabinet type on foreign policy behavior were examined using 
multiple regression analysis.  Separate models were run for each dependent variable.  In 
Table 2, regression estimates are first presented for the dependent variable of level of 
conflict-cooperation.  Across 18,220 events there is a significant relationship between 
cabinet type and level of conflict-cooperation.  Coalitions are associated with more 
conflict-prone behavior than single party cabinets (p<.000).  This finding runs counter to 
our proposition that it is not reasonable to predict the content of foreign policy from the 
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government structure alone.  Indeed, at first blush, this finding seems to justify those who 
have posited a relationship between government structure and the peace/war-proneness of 
a country, especially those having argued that coalition cabinets are more prone to 
conflictual behavior.  
--- Table 2 here --- 
 Table 2 also presents regression estimates for the two dependent variables 
measuring extremity (conflict-cooperation extremity and commitment extremity).  Across 
26,143 events there is a significant relationship between cabinet type and conflict-
cooperation extremity (p<.000).ix  Coalition governments tend to engage in more extreme 
behavior than single party governments.  This finding is consistent with the proposition 
that coalitions pursue more aggressive and/or more cooperative strategies because of their 
institutional and political dynamics. 
 With regard to the commitment variable we find a similar pattern.  Using logit 
analysis, across 26,806 events, coalition governments were more likely to engage in high 
commitment behavior (more extreme behavior) than single party governments (p<.000).  
As with conflict-cooperation extremity, this finding suggests that coalitions are not 
constrained, are hijacked toward extremity, or try to divert attention from domestic 
problems, thus resulting in more extreme foreign policy behaviors. 
On closer examination, however, a difficulty arises with regard to drawing 
conclusions from these analyses. In particular, the results may be driven by particular 
countries that dominate the dataset.  Specifically, Israel (as the actor in over 30% of the 
events), the United Kingdom (as the actor in over 15% of the events), and West Germany 
(as the actor in over 11% of the events), together constitute more than three-fifths of the 
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data.  Germany and Israel together account for 82% of the events with coalition cabinets 
and the United Kingdom accounts for over 34% of the events with single-party cabinets.  
Thus, these three countries undoubtedly have a disproportionate influence on the results.  
Furthermore, Israel, with the highest percentage of events in the dataset, engages in the 
most conflictual behavior of the parliamentary democracies and exhibits very high levels 
of extremity in terms of both conflict-cooperation and commitment. 
 For these reasons, we performed two additional sets of analyses, each of which 
adjusts for the distortion associated with countries that dominate the dataset.  The first set 
of analyses (see Table 3) weights the cases so that all countries’ events are equal in the 
analysis.  This is done by weighting each country’s events to the mean number of events 
across countries.  In this way, no country is disproportionate in the data, and the total 
number of events is preserved.  This analysis yields results consistent with our hypothesis 
that cabinet type is not related to the level of conflict-cooperation.  The relationship is 
positive (coalitions are more cooperative than single party cabinets) but is not significant 
(p=.352). The relationships between cabinet type and extremity, however, remain 
significant.  As before, coalitions engage in more extreme conflictual-cooperative 
behavior than single-parties, (p=.000) and are more likely to engage in high commitment 
behaviors (p=.000).  
--- Table 3 here --- 
 
 An alternative approach to aggregating the data was explored in order to further 
address the disproportionate influence of some countries.  Instead of examining all events 
from single-party government in comparison to all events from coalition governments, 
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we aggregated the events by individual governments.  For each country we established 
the beginning and end date of every government.  We coded each individual government 
as a single party or coalition, and then took the mean value for each dependent variable 
across all events for that government.  Thus, each government has a score for level of 
cooperation/conflict based on that government’s average cooperation/conflict score 
across all events coded for that government.  The same was done for the Extremity 
variable and for the Commitment variable, as well as for the control variables (Power, 
and Democratic Target).x  This results in a much smaller dataset that consists of 216 
governments (rather than 26,000+ events).  It also has the effect of creating greater 
equality for the number of observations across countries.  The number of governments 
within countries ranges from 4 (Iceland and Spain) to 25 (Italy), with Israel having 17, 
the U.K. having 9, and Germany having 12 (see Table 4).xi     
 
  --- Table 4 here --- 
 
As with the weighted analysis, the results of this test (see Table 5) support our 
expectation that cabinet type is not significantly related to conflict-cooperation (p=.283).  
The results are also consistent with the previous analyses in that coalitions engage in 
more extreme conflictual-cooperative foreign policy behaviors than single-party 
governments (p=.029). Contrary to the previous analyses, however, the relationship 
between cabinet type and commitment is no longer significant (p=.475), although it is in 
the same direction. 
--- Table 5 here --- 
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 From these three sets of analyses, we cannot conclude that coalitions are more 
peaceful, as some contend, or more aggressive, as others argue.  This is consistent with 
the mixed findings of previous studies.  We can, however, be more confident that cabinet 
type is related to extremity of action.  In all three tests, coalitions exhibited more extreme 
behaviors compared to single party cabinets.  In two of the three tests, coalitions were 
associated with more committed behaviors.xii 
 
Discussion 
 Our results point to the conclusion that the institutional and political dynamics of 
coalitions affect the character of their foreign policy.  In the events analyzed here, 
coalitions tend to be more extreme in their conflict-cooperation behavior than single party 
governments.  With event data, however, it is difficult to investigate the possible 
mechanisms behind this finding.  There are several possibilities in the extant literature.  
First, since senior parties usually have to rely on more extreme, ideological junior parties 
with whom they are vulnerable to blackmail attempts, coalitions may be “hijacked” by 
these junior parties, in both extreme directions.  Junior parties that are able to influence 
foreign policy may pull the cabinet towards highly cooperative policies or highly 
aggressive policies.  Second, if coalitions are inherently weak domestically, then they 
may need to engage in “high profile” foreign policies in order to gain legitimacy and/or 
divert attention from their domestic problems.  This argument is usually used to predict 
more conflictual policies, but one could argue that highly cooperative foreign policies 
would serve the same purposes.  Finally, if coalitions are less constrained than single 
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parties in that the multiple actors make it more difficult for others to assign responsibility 
to any single party, coalitions may feel more comfortable engaging in extreme endeavors.  
Again, this argument is usually made to justify the expectation that coalitions are more 
conflictual, but if both highly conflictual and highly cooperative behavior and high 
commitment behavior entail risks, then the diffusion of authority that comes with 
multiparty coalitions may be behind these risky choices. 
Interestingly, these possible explanations for the relationship between cabinet type 
and more extreme foreign policy parallel the research on group polarization in social 
psychology.  This research focuses on the finding from several studies that groups make 
more extreme choices than do individuals (Myers and Lamm, 1976; Brauer and Judd, 
1996).  More than the sum of their parts, groups tend to engage in excessively cautious or 
risky behavior (Brown, 2000).xiii  Polarization means “the average postgroup response 
will tend to be more extreme in the same direction as the average of the pregroup 
response” (Myers and Lamm, 1976:603).  Evidence for group polarization comes from 
studies conducted in over a dozen different countries and from a wide-range of research 
on attitudes, jury decisions, ethical decisions, judgment, person perception, and risk 
taking (Myers and Lamm, 1976; Brauer and Judd, 1996). 
Psychologists and political scientists who have utilized this research to look at 
policymaking groups have offered several explanations behind group polarization, 
including diffusion of responsibility, persuasion by leaders or by a minority within the 
group, and information-sharing practices (for reviews, see Vertzberger, 1997; Brown, 
2000).  This research has rarely looked at institutional characteristics that might enhance 
group polarization (Janis’s work on groupthink (1972) is one exception).  We argue, 
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however, that coalitions provide an institutional setting that is ripe for such polarization, 
for the reasons discussed above.   
Still, what accounts for the observed extremity in the foreign policies of coalitions 
is unclear and further research is necessary to investigate the possibilities.  This future 
research could be guided by parallel ideas from social psychological research on group 
polarization.xiv  Case study research that traced the process of coalition decision making 
would shed light on the underlying mechanisms linking institutional and political 
conditions to foreign policy outcomes.  If junior parties and their persuasive and 
manipulative techniques are actually the source of extreme policy positions, this 
explanation gains greater credibility. 
Further research might also focus on the differences between coalitions and even 
on the notion that the categories of multi- and single-party cabinets are not dichotomous, 
but rather exist on a continuous dimension of coalition character (Nousiainen and 
Blondel:306).  Thus, some coalitions might behave more like our expectations of single-
party cabinets, and vice versa. It may be that the different images of coalition politics, as 
described above, stem from different types of coalitions.  Certain coalitions, for example, 
may be more prone to conflict, while others are more likely to be cooperative, regardless 
of their external environments. 
What factors might we investigate as possible conditions affecting the coalition 
character of cabinets?  Hagan (1993) offers some avenues in his discussion of how 
coalitions can escape internal divisions and act coherently.  He argues that the precise 
distribution of power among the parties in the cabinet, the degree of policy agreement 
that exists inside and outside the cabinet, the overall nature of political relationships 
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among the coalition parties (i.e. the presence or absence of consensual norms), and the 
extent of opposition within the coalition partners all influence the nature of the 
policymaking process and the decisions that coalitions make (Hagan, 1993:27-30; see 
also Hagan et al., 2001).  Many of these factors are consistent with how coalition 
theorists (e.g., Dodd, 1976; Strøm, 1990; Laver and Shepsle, 1996) categorize cabinets.  
Coalition theory has focused on predicting what types of coalitions might emerge – e.g., 
minimum winning majority coalitions, grand coalitions, minority coalitions, etc.  While 
there has been little research on the effects of these coalition types on cabinet processes 
and policy choices (Browne, 1982; Müller and Strøm, 2000), the types of coalitions 
suggested by this body of work could be useful in future research on how coalition 
politics influence policymaking and foreign policy behaviors. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  
INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS ON CHARACTER, NOT CONTENT 
 
Coalitions and Single Party governments appear to behave differently in foreign 
policy.  Our analyses, however, suggest that institutional differences do not directly 
translate into differences in the content of policies.  Generally, coalitions do not engage in 
either more cooperative or more conflictual behavior compared to single party cabinets.  
This runs counter to much of the research that assumes a unidirectional policy effect of 
institutions.  In particular, the structural explanation of the democratic peace assumes that 
the constraints built-in to democratic institutions produces more peaceful behavior.  We 
have argued, however, that this confounds institutions with the policy positions of 
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domestic actors and that it is necessary to know both positions and institutions in order to 
have clear expectations about the direction of a state’s foreign policy.  In the case of 
coalitions, it is important to know the preferences of parliaments and the multiple parties 
within the cabinet who may constrain or push the state in policy choices.  
Rather than directly affecting the content of foreign policy in a single direction, 
the institutional dynamics associated with multiparty cabinets appear to have an 
independent effect on the character of their foreign policies.  This study suggests that 
coalitions engage in more extreme behaviors. The search for the underlying mechanisms 
that translate institutional constraints and incentives into more extreme foreign policies 
leads us to a focus on policymaking processes, such as the relationships between cabinet 
members, the influence strategies junior parties use, and the effects of accountability on 
policymakers.  These processes, in addition to actors’ preferences, are often assumed but 
seldom investigated in extant research.  Given the importance of the states in 
contemporary global politics that are ruled by coalitions (such as India, Turkey, and 
Japan), we believe it is critical to enhance our understanding of the policymaking 
processes that lead multiparty cabinets to adopt extreme foreign policies.  
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1 
Countries and Cabinet Types 
 
# of Events with # of Events with    
Actor  Single Party Cabinets Coalition Cabinets Total Events 
 
Australia  292   286   578 
Austria   192   112   304 
Belgium  0   238   238 
Canada   1187   0   1187 
Denmark  93   73   166 
West Germany  17   2958   2975 
Greece   570   2   572 
Iceland   0   138   138 
India   1918   5   1923 
Ireland   177   111   288 
Israel   0   9320   9320 
Italy   108   817   925 
Japan   1865   0   1865 
Luxembourg  0   40   40 
Netherlands  0   329   329 
New Zealand  272   0   272 
Norway  101   104   205 
Spain   307   0   307 
Sweden   329   44   373 
Turkey   409   334   743 
United Kingdom 4096   0   4096 
 
Total   11933   14911   26844 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
Cabinet Type and Foreign Policy Event Behaviors 
 
 
COOPERATION/CONFLICT 
 
    Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  -.297  .065   .000  
  
Actor Power  35.069  1.744   .000 
 
 Democratic Target 1.512  .056   .000 
   
 (N = 18,220)    
 
 
     EXTREMTIY OF ACTION 
Coefficient Standard Error  Significance 
Cabinet Type  .243  .039   .000 
 
 Actor Power  -13.192 1.063   .000 
             
 (N= 26,143) 
  
 
     COMMITMENT 
    Coefficient Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Type  .184  .036   .000 
 
 Actor Power  -18.1  1.088   .000 
             
 (N= 26, 806) 
 
 
aThe coefficient is the unstandardized estimate from the regression analysis (logit 
analysis for the commitment variable).  
bCabinets were coded  positive for coalitions (0=single party, 1= coalition) 
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 3 
Cabinet Type and Foreign Policy Behavior: 
Weighted Cases 
 
COOPERATION/CONFLICT 
    Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  .052  .056   .352 
 
 Actor Power  19.305  1.722   .000 
  
 Democratic Target .238  .055   .000  
   
 (N = 18,918)  
 
EXTREMITY OF ACTION 
    Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  ..213  .030   .000 
 
 Actor Power  -3.423  .936   .000 
             
(N= 26,062) 
  
COMMITMENT 
Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  .137  .032   .000 
 
 Actor Power  -10.205 1.121   .000 
           
(N= 26,806) 
 
 
aThe coefficient is the unstandardized estimate from the regression analysis (logit 
analysis for the commitment variable).  
bCabinets were coded  positive for coalitions (0=single party, 1= coalition) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4 
Cabinets and Cabinet Typesa 
 
 Actor  Single Party Cabinets  Coalition Cabinets Total Cabinets 
Australia  5    8   13  
Austria   5    3   8 
Belgium  0    8   8  
Canada   10    0   10 
Denmark  7    3   10  
West Germany  1    11   12  
Greece   6    0   6  
Iceland   0    4   4  
India   9    1   10  
Ireland   6    2   8  
Israel   0    17   17 
Italy   6    19   25  
Japan   17    0   17 
Luxembourg  0    5   5 
Netherlands  0    10   10 
New Zealand  9    0   9 
Norway  6    4   10  
Spain   4    0   4 
Sweden   8    3   11  
Turkey   7    4   11  
United Kingdom 9    0   9 
 
 Total   115    102   217 
 
 
aOnly cabinets with five or more events are included in this analysis so that a cabinet’s foreign 
policy behavior would not be represented by a very small number of events. 
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______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 5 
Cabinet Type and Foreign Policy Behavior: 
Cabinet Aggregates 
 
 
COOPERATION/CONFLICT 
    Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  -.215  .199   .283 
 
 Actor Power  15.334  5.877   .01  
 
 Democratic Target .14  .453   .758   
 
(N = 217)  
 
EXTREMITY OF ACTION 
    Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  .245  .111   .029    
 
 Actor Power  -2.685  3.291   .415    
             
(N= 217) 
  
COMMITMENT 
Coefficienta Standard Error  Significance 
 
 Cabinet Typeb  .012  .017   .475   
  
 Actor Power  1.542  .514   .003   
             
(N= 217) 
 
 
aThe coefficient is the unstandardized estimate from the regression analysis.  
bCabinets were coded  positive for coalitions (0=single party, 1= coalition) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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NOTES 
                                                 
i This is consistent with the literature on group polarization that suggests group processes 
generate more extreme choices than group members would make independently (see, for 
example, Vertzberger, 1997). 
ii The expectation that coalition cabinets are immobilized is strongly rooted in historical 
examples from the French experience (see Hagan, 1993, Elman, 2000, and Ripsman, 
2002). 
iii One parliamentary democracy that was in the data set, Malta, was not included in this 
analysis due to its very small number of events (3).  This did not affect the pattern of 
results. 
iv The sources used were: Dodd (1969; 1983) Ahmad (1977), Strøm (1990), Van 
Roozendaal (1992), Derbyshire and Derbyshire (2000), Hale (2000), Hideo (2000), 
Müller and Strøm (2000), Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2000), Close (2002), 
Mershon (2002), and Moon and Sharmon (2003). 
v Absolute values of the cooperation-conflict scales were used so that both the highest 
levels of conflict and the highest levels of cooperation received the same score (+10). 
vi The following action categories were coded as low commitment:  comment, consult, 
approve, promise, agree, request, propose, reject, accuse, protest, deny, demand, warn, 
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threaten.  The action categories coded as high commitment were:  yield, grant, reward, 
demonstrate, reduce relations, expel, seize, force.    
vii The variables commitment and extremity of behavior are correlated  (Pearson 
correlation .694) but are not identical. 
viii Not all of the targets of the actions were states.  All non-state actors were therefore not 
coded for this control variable and these events were not included in the analysis of 
cooperative behavior. 
ix With the extremity dependent variables, there is no theoretical or empirical rationale for 
including as a control variable the status of the target in terms of whether it is a 
democracy or not.  Thus, this control variable is not included in the models with the 
conflict-cooperation extremity dependent variable or the commitment extremity 
dependent variable.  
x The CINC data is annual.  In those instances when a government was in power through 
two or more calendar years, the average CINC value was used.   
xi The 217 cabinets had a mean number of events of 123.    
xii In an additional set of analyses, we examined all events, unweighted and unaggregated, 
except those in which the actor was Germany, Israel, and the United Kingdom.  Leblang 
and Chan (2003) likewise omit Israel from their analyses of war involvement for similar 
reasons. This analysis revealed the exact same pattern as the weighted analyses.  With the 
three most dominant actors omitted, across 7,691 events, the relationship between cabinet 
type and level of conflict-cooperation is no longer significant (p=.5).  The relationships 
between cabinet type and extremity of behavior, however, remains significant.  As 
before, coalitions are more likely to engage in more extreme conflict-cooperation 
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behaviors (n=10,106; p.=.003) and more extreme commitment behavior (n=10,454; 
p=.03).  
xiii Earlier research focused on the “risky-shift phenomenon”, assuming that groups 
engage in more extreme behaviors, but later studies demonstrated that the shift occurs in 
both directions, leading to the more general term “group polarization.” 
xiv Along these lines, Kaarbo (1996a, 1996b) used theoretical ideas from research in 
social psychology on minority influence to analyze the conditions under which junior 
parties in Israel and Germany successfully influence foreign policy. 
 
